We evaluate the allocation of risk between firms and their workers using matched employer-
employee panel data. Unlike previous contributions, this paper focuses on idiosyncratic …

This paper studies an infinite horizon adverse selection model with an underlying Markov
information process. It introduces a graphic representation of continuation contracts and …

This symposium examines both extensions of familiar problems as well as some new
directions for computational methods. Most economists are familiar with the applied general …

In a repeated unobserved endowment economy in which agents negotiate long-term
contracts with a financial intermediary, we study the risk sharing implications of the …

This dissertation explores the implications of private information on the tradeoff between
incentives to work and risk-sharing, and on the choice of capital structure and performance …

This paper considers a moral hazard problem in an infinite# horizon, principal# agent
framework. In the model, both the principal and the agent can commit only to short# term …

This paper considers a moral hazard problem in an infinite# horizon, principal# agent
framework characterized by limited commitment and history# dependent reservation utilities …

This paper considers a moral hazard problem in an infinite# horizon, principal# agent
framework characterized by limited commitment and history# dependent reservation utilities …

The full insurance hypothesis states that shocks to the firm's performance do not affect
workers' compensation. In principal-agent models with moral hazard, firms trade off …

This paper considers a moral hazard problem in an infinite# horizon, principal# agent
framework characterized by limited commitment and history# dependent reservation utilities …