Determinacy without the Taylor principle
GM Angeletos, C Lian - Journal of Political Economy, 2023 - journals.uchicago.edu
Our understanding of monetary policy is complicated by an indeterminacy problem: the
same path for the nominal interest rate is consistent with multiple equilibrium paths for …
same path for the nominal interest rate is consistent with multiple equilibrium paths for …
A foundation for Markov equilibria in sequential games with finite social memory
We study stochastic games with an infinite horizon and sequential moves played by an
arbitrary number of players. We assume that social memory is finite—every player, except …
arbitrary number of players. We assume that social memory is finite—every player, except …
Instability of belief-free equilibria
Y Heller - Journal of Economic Theory, 2017 - Elsevier
Various papers have presented folk theorem results for repeated games with private
monitoring that rely on belief-free equilibria. I show that these equilibria are not robust …
monitoring that rely on belief-free equilibria. I show that these equilibria are not robust …
Coordination failure in repeated games with private monitoring
T Sugaya, S Takahashi - Journal of Economic Theory, 2013 - Elsevier
Players coordinate continuation play in repeated games with public monitoring. We
investigate the robustness of such equilibrium behavior with respect to ex-ante small private …
investigate the robustness of such equilibrium behavior with respect to ex-ante small private …
Blackwell Equilibrium in Repeated Games
C Cavounidis, S Ghosh, J Hörner, E Solan… - arXiv preprint arXiv …, 2025 - arxiv.org
We apply Blackwell optimality to repeated games. An equilibrium whose strategy profile is
sequentially rational for all high enough discount factors simultaneously is a Blackwell …
sequentially rational for all high enough discount factors simultaneously is a Blackwell …