Explainability in mechanism design: recent advances and the road ahead

SA Suryanarayana, D Sarne, S Kraus - European Conference on Multi …, 2022 - Springer
Designing and implementing explainable systems is seen as the next step towards
increasing user trust in, acceptance of and reliance on Artificial Intelligence (AI) systems …

Learning to manipulate under limited information

WH Holliday, A Kristoffersen, E Pacuit - arXiv preprint arXiv:2401.16412, 2024 - arxiv.org
By classic results in social choice theory, any reasonable preferential voting method
sometimes gives individuals an incentive to report an insincere preference. The extent to …

Strategic voting in the lab: compromise and leader bias behavior

R Meir, K Gal, M Tal - Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems, 2020 - Springer
Plurality voting is perhaps the most commonly used way to aggregate the preferences of
multiple voters. Yet, there is no consensus on how people vote strategically, even in very …

[PDF][PDF] Closing the loop: Bringing humans into empirical computational social choice and preference reasoning

N Mattei - Proceedings of the twenty-ninth international …, 2021 - ijcai.org
Research in both computational social choice and preference reasoning uses tools and
techniques from computer science, generally algorithms and complexity analysis, to …

Manipulation of opinion polls to influence iterative elections

D Baumeister, AK Selker, A Wilczynski - 19th International Conference …, 2020 - hal.science
In classical elections, voters only submit their ballot once, whereas in iterative voting, the
ballots may be changed iteratively. Following the work by Wilczynski [2019], we consider the …

Voting behavior in one-shot and iterative multiple referenda

U Grandi, J Lang, AI Ozkes, S Airiau - Social Choice and Welfare, 2024 - Springer
We consider a set of voters making a collective decision via simultaneous vote on two binary
issues. Voters' preferences are captured by payoffs assigned to combinations of outcomes …

Strategy-proof budgeting via a VCG-like mechanism

J Wagner, R Meir - International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory, 2023 - Springer
We present a strategy-proof public goods budgeting mechanism where agents determine
both the total volume of expenses and specific allocation. It is constructed as a modification …

[PDF][PDF] Heuristic strategies in uncertain approval voting environments

J Scheuerman, JL Harman, N Mattei… - arXiv preprint arXiv …, 2019 - drjaelle.com
Computational Social Choice (COMSOC) investigates computational issues surrounding the
aggregation of individual preferences and collective decision making [7]. Much of this work …

Modeling voters in multi-winner approval voting

J Scheuerman, J Harman, N Mattei… - Proceedings of the AAAI …, 2021 - ojs.aaai.org
In many real world situations, collective decisions are made using voting and, in scenarios
such as committee or board elections, employing voting rules that return multiple winners. In …

[PDF][PDF] Heuristics in multi-winner approval voting

J Scheuerman, JL Harman, N Mattei… - arXiv preprint arXiv …, 2019 - researchgate.net
In many real world situations, collective decisions are made using voting. Moreover,
scenarios such as committee or board elections require voting rules that return multiple …