But what do these statements mean? This may be understood as a metaphysical question about what kinds of things are probabilities, or more generally as a question about what …
Many views rely on the idea that it can never be rational to have high confidence in something like," P, but my evidence doesn't support P." Call this idea the" Non-Akrasia …
M Titelbaum - Oxford studies in epistemology, 2015 - books.google.com
Rational requirements have a special status in the theory of rationality. This is obvious in one sense: they supply the content of that theory. But I want to suggest that rational …
I formulate a resilient paradox about epistemic rationality, discuss and reject various solutions, and sketch a way out. The paradox exemplifies a tension between a wide range of …
Plausibly, you should believe what your total evidence supports. But cases of misleading higher-order evidence—evidence about what your evidence supports—present a challenge …
K Dorst - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 2020 - Wiley Online Library
Assume that it is your evidence that determines what opinions you should have. I argue that since you should take peer disagreement seriously, evidence must have two features.(1) It …
K Dorst - Philosophical Review, 2023 - read.dukeupress.edu
Predictable polarization is everywhere: we can often predict how people's opinions, including our own, will shift over time. Extant theories either neglect the fact that we can …
Higher-order evidence is evidence which bears on a believer's rational capacities, epistemic performance, or evidential situation. Many epistemologists hold that this kind of evidence …
M Schoenfield - The Journal of Philosophy, 2015 - JSTOR
The thought that some connection must exist between rationality and accuracy is certainly not a new one. Stewart Cohen notes that:" A variety of philosophers from Descartes to the …