We study the problem of multi-dimensional revenue maximization when selling m items to a
buyer that has additive valuations for them, drawn from a (possibly correlated) prior …

We study IID prophet inequalities for cost minimization, where the problem is to pick a cost
from a sequence X 1,…, Xn drawn independently from a known distribution in an online …

Prophet inequalities for rewards maximization are fundamental to optimal stopping theory
with extensive applications to mechanism design and online optimization. We study …

This paper considers Bayesian revenue maximization in the k-unit setting, where a
monopolist seller has k copies of an indivisible item and faces n unit-demand buyers (whose …

We study the performance of anonymous posted-price selling mechanisms for a standard
Bayesian auction setting, where n bidders have iid valuations for a single item. We show that …

We study a fundamental problem in optimization under uncertainty. There are $ n $ boxes;
each box $ i $ contains a hidden reward $ x_i $. Rewards are drawn iid from an unknown …

We focus on a canonical Bayesian mechanism design setting: a seller wants to sell a single
item to n bidders, whose values are drawn iid from a monotone-hazard-rate distribution. In …

We consider the problem of posting prices for unit-demand buyers if all $ n $ buyers have
identically distributed valuations drawn from a distribution with monotone hazard rate. We …

Online resource allocation problems play a fundamental role in online decision making. In
these problems, a sequence of agents arrives one-by-one, each with the goal of being …

Bayesian Auction Design and Approximation Yaonan Jin Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of Doct Page 1 Bayesian Auction Design and Approximation …