Competitive situations resembling contests are ubiquitous in modern economic landscape.
In a contest, economic agents expend costly effort to vie for limited prizes, and they are …

We study optimal information design in static contests where contestants do not know their
values of winning. The designer aims at maximizing the total expected effort. Before the …

We use a laboratory experiment to study the effects of disclosing the number of active
participants in contests with endogenous entry. At the first stage, potential participants …

A contestant's effort depends on her knowledge of her rival's type. This knowledge is often
limited in real-life contests. We propose a model where the principal of a contest has …

We study optimal exchange of private information in a two-player all-pay auction contest with
independent private binary values. A benevolent information center who is informed about …

We study all-pay auctions with one-sided private information and interdependent valuations.
To sharpen the competition and maximize revenue, the auction organizer can design an …

In perfectly discriminating contests with private information, low-ability contestants prefer to
appear strong, while high-ability contestants prefer to appear weak. In a two-stage contest …

Two players with independent private values compete for a prize in an all-pay contest.
Before the contest, each player can spy on the opponent by privately acquiring a costly …

Two players compete for a prize in an all-pay auction where their private binary valuations
are independent from each other. A contest organizer commits to disclose additional …

We investigate how risk aversion affects the organizer's disclosing the actual number of
bidders in an all‐pay auction with an exogenous bid cap and stochastic entry. With an …