We present a survey of the emerging literature on the design of matching markets. We
survey the articles on discrete resource allocation problems, their solutions, and their …

We introduce a new notion of ex ante stability (or fairness) that would be desirable for a
school‐choice mechanism to satisfy. Our criterion stipulates that a mechanism must be …

Efficiency and symmetric treatment of agents are the primary goals of resource allocation in
environments without transfers. Focusing on ordinal mecha-nisms in which no small group …

This paper studies the problem of assigning a set of indivisible objects to a set of agents
when monetary transfers are not allowed and agents reveal only ordinal preferences, but …

We study a probabilistic assignment problem when agents have multi-unit demands for
objects. We first introduce two fairness requirements to accommodate different demands …

We consider probabilistic allocation of objects under ordinal preferences and constraints on
allocations. We devise an allocation mechanism, called the vigilant eating rule (VER), that …

The probabilistic serial (PS) rule is one of the most prominent randomized rules for the
assignment problem. It is well-known for its superior fairness and welfare properties …

Kidney exchange programs utilize both deceased-donor and live-donor kidneys. One of
these programs, a two-way kidney paired donation (KPD), involves two patients exchanging …

This paper generalizes the Probabilistic Serial (PS) mechanism of Bogomolnaia and Moulin
(2001) to matching markets with arbitrary constraints. The constraints are modeled as a set …

The probabilistic serial (PS) rule is a prominent randomized rule for assigning indivisible
goods to agents. Although it is well known for its good fairness and welfare properties, it is …