Game theory meets wireless sensor networks security requirements and threats mitigation: A survey

MS Abdalzaher, K Seddik, M Elsabrouty, O Muta… - Sensors, 2016 - mdpi.com
We present a study of using game theory for protecting wireless sensor networks (WSNs)
from selfish behavior or malicious nodes. Due to scalability, low complexity and …

[PDF][PDF] Dynamic games for secure and resilient control system design

Y Huang, J Chen, L Huang, Q Zhu - National Science Review, 2020 - academic.oup.com
Modern control systems are featured by their hierarchical structure composed of cyber,
physical and human layers. The intricate dependencies among multiple layers and units of …

FlipThem: Modeling targeted attacks with FlipIt for multiple resources

A Laszka, G Horvath, M Felegyhazi… - Decision and Game Theory …, 2014 - Springer
Recent high-profile targeted attacks showed that even the most secure and secluded
networks can be compromised by motivated and resourceful attackers, and that such a …

Empirical game-theoretic analysis for moving target defense

A Prakash, MP Wellman - Proceedings of the second ACM workshop on …, 2015 - dl.acm.org
The effectiveness of a moving target defense depends on how it is deployed through specific
system operations over time, and how attackers may respond to this deployment. We define …

Defense against advanced persistent threat through data backup and recovery

LX Yang, K Huang, X Yang, Y Zhang… - … on Network Science …, 2020 - ieeexplore.ieee.org
Advanced persistent threat (APT) as a generic highly sophisticated cyber attack poses a
severe threat to organizational data security. Since the conventional detection and repair …

: An Adaptive Reinforcement Learning Strategy for the Security Game

L Oakley, A Oprea - International Conference on Decision and Game …, 2019 - Springer
A rise in Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs) has introduced a need for robustness against
long-running, stealthy attacks which circumvent existing cryptographic security guarantees …

Mitigating covert compromises: A game-theoretic model of targeted and non-targeted covert attacks

A Laszka, B Johnson, J Grossklags - … , MA, USA, December 11-14, 2013 …, 2013 - Springer
Attackers of computing resources increasingly aim to keep security compromises hidden
from defenders in order to extract more value over a longer period of time. These covert …

FlipLeakage: a game-theoretic approach to protect against stealthy attackers in the presence of information leakage

S Farhang, J Grossklags - Decision and Game Theory for Security: 7th …, 2016 - Springer
One of the particularly daunting issues in the cybersecurity domain is information leakage of
business or consumer data, which is often triggered by multi-stage attacks and advanced …

The work-averse cyber attacker model: Theory and evidence from two million attack signatures

L Allodi, F Massacci, JM Williams - Available at SSRN 2862299, 2017 - papers.ssrn.com
A common conceit is that the typical cyber attacker is assumed to be all powerful and able to
exploit all possible vulnerabilities with almost equal likelihood. In this paper we present, and …

How task familiarity and cognitive predispositions impact behavior in a security game of timing

J Grossklags, D Reitter - 2014 IEEE 27th Computer Security …, 2014 - ieeexplore.ieee.org
This paper addresses security and safety choices that involve a decision on the timing of an
action. Examples of such decisions include when to check log files for intruders and when to …