Voters have strong incentives to increase their influence by trading votes, acquiring others'
votes when preferences are strong in exchange for giving votes away when preferences are …

We study shareholder voting in a model in which trading affects the composition of the
shareholder base. Trading and voting are complementary, which gives rise to self‐fulfilling …

We analyze the design of recommendations (available to all shareholders) and research
reports (available only to subscribers) by a proxy advisor, who maximizes profits from selling …

This paper develops a unified theory of blockholder governance and the voting premium. It
explains how a voting premium emerges when a minority blockholder tries to influence the …

Blockholders play a large role in corporate governance. We examine their voting behavior
by adding a voter with many votes, ie, a blockholder, to a standard voting model. A …

Abstract Research Question/Issue In this paper, we examine the effects of share lending or
recall on proxy voting, with a particular focus on the role of index funds. Research …

This paper examines the comparative properties of voting rules based on the richness of
their ballot spaces, assuming a given distribution of voting rights. We focus on how well …

New investment techniques and new types of shareholder activists are shaking up the
traditional ways of equity investment that informs much of our present-day corporate law and …

We study an information sale problem in which a monopolist proxy advisor sells
recommendations to a firm's shareholders for corporate voting. We find that even an …

This article analyses how outsiders, such as bidders or activist investors, overcome the lack
of coordination and information among dispersed shareholders. We identify the two basic …