Whenever a group of multiple agents aims at reaching a joint decision in a fair and
principled way, they need to aggregate their individual preferences using a voting rule …

Abstract The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem implies that all anonymous, Pareto-optimal, and
single-valued social choice functions can be strategically manipulated. In this paper, we …

There is a long tradition of fruitful interaction between logic and social choice theory. In
recent years, much of this interaction has focused on computer-aided methods such as SAT …

This work describes the formalisation of a recent result from Randomised Social Choice
Theory in Isabelle/HOL. The original result had been obtained through the use of linear …

There is a long tradition of fruitful interaction between logic and social choice theory. In
recent years, much of this interaction has focused on computer-aided methods such as SAT …

The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem implies that all anonymous, Paretooptimal, and single-
valued social choice functions can be strategically manipulated. In this paper, we investigate …

Voting rules allow groups of agents to aggregate their preferences in order to reach joint
decisions. The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem, a seminal result in social choice theory …