The study of approximate mechanism design for facility location problems has been in the
center of research at the intersection of artificial intelligence and economics for the last …

We consider the facility location problem in the one-dimensional setting where each facility
can serve a limited number of agents from the algorithmic and mechanism design …

The facility location game is an extensively studied problem in mechanism design. In the
classical model, the cost of each agent is her distance to the nearest facility. In this paper, we …

We focus on a simple, one-dimensional collective decision problem (often referred to as the
facility location problem) and explore issues of strategyproofness and proportionality-based …

Mechanism Design seeks to establish protocols for aggregating the private information of a
set of agents to optimize a global objective. Nonetheless, optimizing a communal goal solely …

In this paper, we study the two-facility location game on a line with optional preference
where the acceptable set of facilities for each agent could be different and an agent's cost is …

We study the facility location problems where agents are located on a real line and divided
into groups based on criteria such as ethnicity or age. Our aim is to design mechanisms to …

We consider the problem of locating a facility to serve a set of agents located along a line.
The Nash welfare objective function, defined as the product of the agents' utilities, is known …

The location of a logistics center is very important in a logistics system, as the success of the
location determines the whole logistics system's structure, shape, and mode, and not only …

This paper examines the mechanism design for a two-facility-location game involving two
types of agents. Type I agents only prioritize the facility closer to their location, while type II …