Open problems in cooperative ai

A Dafoe, E Hughes, Y Bachrach, T Collins… - arXiv preprint arXiv …, 2020 - arxiv.org
Problems of cooperation--in which agents seek ways to jointly improve their welfare--are
ubiquitous and important. They can be found at scales ranging from our daily routines--such …

Rationalist approaches to conflict prevention and resolution

AH Kydd - Annual Review of Political Science, 2010 - annualreviews.org
An emerging literature on civil and international conflict management is developing and
testing insights from formal theories of conflict. Third parties may attempt to prevent or …

Mediation, arbitration and negotiation

M Goltsman, J Hörner, G Pavlov, F Squintani - Journal of Economic Theory, 2009 - Elsevier
We compare three common dispute resolution processes–negotiation, mediation, and
arbitration–in the framework of Crawford and Sobel [V. Crawford, J. Sobel, Strategic …

Mediation, military, and money: The promises and pitfalls of outside interventions to end armed conflicts

D Rohner - Journal of Economic Literature, 2024 - aeaweb.org
Wars impose tremendous costs on societies and the question of how to end them is of
foremost importance. Several hundred books and scientific articles have been written on …

Strategic information acquisition and transmission

R Argenziano, S Severinov… - American Economic …, 2016 - pubs.aeaweb.org
This paper explores the implications of costly information acquisition in a strategic
communication setting. We show that equilibrium decisions based on a biased expert's …

How to talk to multiple audiences

M Goltsman, G Pavlov - Games and Economic Behavior, 2011 - Elsevier
We analyze the performance of various communication protocols in a generalization of the
Crawford–Sobel (1982) model of cheap talk that allows for multiple receivers. We find that …

The value of mediated communication

A Salamanca - Journal of Economic Theory, 2021 - Elsevier
This paper characterizes optimal mediation in sender-receiver games. We assume that the
mediator's objective is to maximize the ex-ante welfare of the sender. Mediated equilibria …

Contracting with imperfect commitment and noisy communication

H Bester, R Strausz - Journal of Economic Theory, 2007 - Elsevier
This paper provides new analytical tools for studying principal-agent problems with adverse
selection and limited commitment. By allowing the principal to use general communication …

Board bias, information, and investment efficiency

M Gregor, B Michaeli - Review of Accounting Studies, 2024 - Springer
We identify a novel force behind the benefit of misaligned preferences in corporate
governance. Our model entails a CEO who encounters a project and, after gathering …

Advice from multiple experts: A comparison of simultaneous, sequential, and hierarchical communication

M Li - The BE Journal of Theoretical Economics, 2010 - degruyter.com
In this paper, I analyze an example in which two perfectly informed experts advise a decision
maker. Each expert has private information about her own bias. I show that consulting two …