Improving algorithms via predictions is a very active research topic in recent years. This
paper initiates the systematic study of mechanism design in this model. In a number of well …

Budget feasible mechanisms, recently initiated by Singer (FOCS 2010), extend algorithmic
mechanism design problems to a realistic setting with a budget constraint. We consider the …

In this article, we show a tight approximation guarantee for budget-feasible mechanisms with
an additive buyer. We propose a new simple randomized mechanism with approximation …

We study procurement auctions when the buyer has complement-free (subadditive)
objectives in the budget feasibility model (Singer 2010). For general subadditive functions …

We study a type of reverse (procurement) auction problems in the presence of budget
constraints. The general algorithmic problem is to purchase a set of resources, which come …

We consider a single buyer with a combinatorial preference that would like to purchase
related products and services from different vendors, where each vendor supplies exactly …

We study procurement games where each seller supplies multiple units of his item, with a
cost per unit known only to him. The buyer can purchase any number of units from each …

Mobile crowdsensing has become an efficient paradigm for performing large-scale sensing
tasks. An incentive mechanism is important for a mobile crowdsensing system to stimulate …

We study truthful mechanisms for hiring a team of agents in three classes of set systems:
Vertex Cover auctions, How auctions, and cut auctions. For Vertex Cover auctions, the …

We propose a new framework for optimization under fairness constraints. The problems we
consider model procurement where the goal is to optimize a buyer's utility while paying …