Multiagent systems combine multiple autonomous entities, each having diverging interests
or different information. This overview of the field offers a computer science perspective, but …

We study the role that privacy-preserving algorithms, which prevent the leakage of specific
information about participants, can play in the design of mechanisms for strategic agents …

The literature on algorithmic mechanism design is mostly concerned with game-theoretic
versions of optimization problems to which standard economic money-based mechanisms …

A major achievement of mechanism design theory is a general method for the construction
of truthful mechanisms called VCG (Vickrey, Clarke, Groves). When applying this method to …

We study a novel class of mechanism design problems in which the outcomes are
constrained by the payments. This basic class of mechanism design problems captures …

We study a class of single-round, sealed-bid auctions for an item in unlimited supply, such
as a digital good. We introduce the notion of competitive auctions. A competitive auction is …

When Disruption Tolerant Network (DTN) is used in commercial environments, incentive
mechanism should be employed to encourage cooperation among selfish mobile users. Key …

Mechanism design is now a standard tool in computer science for aligning the incentives of
self-interested agents with the objectives of a system designer. There is, however, a …

We study economic incentives for influencing selfish behavior in networks. We consider a
model of selfish routing in which the latency experienced by network traffic on an edge of the …

We consider the problem of selecting a low-cost st path in a graph where the edge costs are
a secret, known only to the various economic agents who own them. To solve this problem …