The top-down governance imperative in addressing climate change distinguishes climate
policies from traditional environmental policies catering to bottom-up governance demand …

To the extent that firms don't internalise the negative externalities of their CO2 emissions,
government intervention is needed to curb global warming. We study the equilibrium …

In the wake of 25 United Nations Climate Change Conferences of the Parties (and counting),
international cooperation on mitigating greenhouse gas emissions to avoid substantial and …

We introduce a novel framework for analyzing coalition formation, applied to climate
cooperation. Our model allows for multiple rounds of negotiations and is able to explain the …

We study the dynamics of equilibrium participation in an international environmental
agreement aimed at increasing the stock of a global public good such as climate change …

We show that an appropriately-designed “Refunding Club” can simultaneously solve both
free-riding problems in mitigating climate change—participating in a coalition with an …

This paper presents a novel dynamic bargaining game where every party is proposing only
its own contribution, before all pledges must be unanimously approved. I show that, with …

There is no way around it. To understand global climate policies–free riding, negotiations,
participation, and compliance–we must draw on game theory and microeconomics. After all …

This paper analyzes the effects of partial cooperation on the breadth and depth of climate
agreements in dynamic games in which countries emit, invest in green technology, decide to …

We perform a laboratory test of Pledge-and-Review bargaining, implementing a simplified
version of the model analysed in Harstad (2021a). In theory, this institution should increase …