We consider two alternatives to optimal auctions: posted-price mechanisms and dynamic
auctions. In posted-price mechanisms, the seller posts a single price and sells the item at …

This article considers a canonical auction protocol that forms the basis of nearly all current
online auctions. Such discrete bid auctions require that the bidders submit bids at …

We study auctions with severe bounds on the communication allowed: each bidder may only
transmit t bits of information to the auctioneer. We consider both welfare-and profit …

We study auctions with severe bounds on the communication allowed: each bidder may only
transmit t bits of information to the auctioneer. We consider both welfare-maximizing and …

We study auctions under restricted communication. Agents have valuations distributed over
an interval but can only report one of a finite number of messages. We provide necessary …

While traditional mechanism design typically assumes isomorphism between the agents'
type-and action spaces, in many situations the agents face strict restrictions on their action …

Classic direct mechanisms require full utility revelation from agents, which can be very
difficult in practical multi-attribute settings. In this work, we study partial revelation within the …

When we work on a practical scheduling task, we usually do not have complete knowledge
of the related resources and constraints. For example, when scheduling a conference, we …

We study auctions under restricted communication. Bidders have valuations in a compact
interval, but can only report one of a finite number of messages. We provide a …

Sequential price mechanisms (SPMs) are a class of indirect mechanisms that can be used to
allocate items in a “take-it-or-leave-it” manner. An SPM visits the agents one at a time …