Optimal auctions through deep learning
Designing an incentive compatible auction that maximizes expected revenue is an intricate
task. The single-item case was resolved in a seminal piece of work by Myerson in 1981 …
task. The single-item case was resolved in a seminal piece of work by Myerson in 1981 …
A duality based unified approach to bayesian mechanism design
We provide a unified view of many recent developments in Bayesian mechanism design,
including the black-box reductions of Cai et. al., simple auctions for additive buyers, and …
including the black-box reductions of Cai et. al., simple auctions for additive buyers, and …
Simple mechanisms for subadditive buyers via duality
We provide simple and approximately revenue-optimal mechanisms in the multi-item multi-
bidder settings. We unify and improve all previous results, as well as generalize the results …
bidder settings. We unify and improve all previous results, as well as generalize the results …
Mechanism design for subadditive agents via an ex ante relaxation
We consider the problem of maximizing revenue for a monopolist offering multiple items to
multiple heterogeneous buyers. We develop a simple mechanism that obtains a constant …
multiple heterogeneous buyers. We develop a simple mechanism that obtains a constant …
Optimal auctions through deep learning
Designing an incentive compatible auction that maximizes expected revenue is an intricate
task. The single-item case was resolved in a seminal piece of work by Myerson in 1981 …
task. The single-item case was resolved in a seminal piece of work by Myerson in 1981 …
The menu-size complexity of revenue approximation
We consider a monopolist that is selling n items to a single additive buyer, where the buyer's
values for the items are drawn according to independent distributions F 1, F 2,…, F n that …
values for the items are drawn according to independent distributions F 1, F 2,…, F n that …
Duality and optimality of auctions for uniform distributions
Y Giannakopoulos, E Koutsoupias - … of the fifteenth ACM conference on …, 2014 - dl.acm.org
We derive exact optimal solutions for the problem of optimizing revenue in single-bidder
multi-item auctions for uniform iid valuations. We give optimal auctions of up to 6 items; …
multi-item auctions for uniform iid valuations. We give optimal auctions of up to 6 items; …
The competition complexity of auctions: A bulow-klemperer result for multi-dimensional bidders
A seminal result of Bulow and Klemperer [1989] demonstrates the power of competition for
extracting revenue: when selling a single item to $ n $ bidders whose values are drawn iid …
extracting revenue: when selling a single item to $ n $ bidders whose values are drawn iid …
Dominant-strategy versus bayesian multi-item auctions: Maximum revenue determination and comparison
ACC Yao - Proceedings of the 2017 ACM Conference on …, 2017 - dl.acm.org
We address two related unanswered questions in maximum revenue multi-item auctions. Is
dominant-strategy implementation equivalent to the semantically less stringent Bayesian …
dominant-strategy implementation equivalent to the semantically less stringent Bayesian …
The optimal mechanism for selling to a budget constrained buyer: The general case
NR Devanur, SM Weinberg - Proceedings of the 2017 ACM Conference …, 2017 - dl.acm.org
We consider a revenue-maximizing seller with a single item facing a single buyer with a
private budget. The (value, budget) pair is drawn from an arbitrary and possibly correlated …
private budget. The (value, budget) pair is drawn from an arbitrary and possibly correlated …