The game theoretic perspective in auction bidding has provided a powerful normative
framework for the analysis of auctions and it has generated an impressive volume of …

This paper studies the role of information asymmetries in second price, common value
auctions. Motivated by information structures that arise commonly in applications such as …

We study a model of common-value auctions with two bidders in which bidders' private
information are independently and asymmetrically distributed. We present sufficient and …

In this paper, we revisit the two-bidder asymmetric all-pay auction of Amann and Leininger
(1996) by allowing interdependent values and correlated signals. Both values and signals …

We consider common-value hybrid auctions among two asymmetrically informed bidders,
where the winning bidder pays his bid with some positive probability k and the losing bid …

We consider the problem of designing the information environment for revenue
maximization in a sealed-bid second price auction with two bidders. Much of the prior …

We show that when the weak bidder's bargaining power in the resale market is weakened,
the auctioneer's revenue from the first-price auction with resale is lower. Using the idea of …

We study how ex ante information asymmetries affect revenue in common-value second-
price auctions, motivated by online advertising auctions where “cookies” inform individual …

When players' affiliated values are symmetrically distributed, expected revenue in the
second-price auction equals or exceeds that in the first-price auction (Milgrom and Weber …

We consider common-value hybrid auctions among two asymmetrically informed bidders, in
which the winning bidder pays his bid with some positive probability κ and the losing bid …