Pairwise stable matching in large economies
M Greinecker, C Kah - Econometrica, 2021 - Wiley Online Library
We formulate a stability notion for two‐sided pairwise matching problems with individually
insignificant agents in distributional form. Matchings are formulated as joint distributions over …
insignificant agents in distributional form. Matchings are formulated as joint distributions over …
Bounded reasoning and higher-order uncertainty
W Kets - Available at SSRN 2116626, 2012 - papers.ssrn.com
The standard framework for analyzing games with incomplete information models players as
if they have an infinite depth of reasoning. This paper generalizes the type spaces of …
if they have an infinite depth of reasoning. This paper generalizes the type spaces of …
A Critical Assessment of the Evolution of Standard Game Theory
L Larrouy - On Coordination in Non-Cooperative Game Theory …, 2023 - Springer
In this chapter, we adopt a history of economic thought approach to highlight the
methodological problems encountered by standard game theory in its treatment of strategic …
methodological problems encountered by standard game theory in its treatment of strategic …
[PDF][PDF] MR4346916 91B68
M Greinecker, C Kah - Econometrica, 2021 - jonathannewton.net
There are two sets of types, W and M, corresponding to sets of women and men. A pair in
W× M is a couple type. For each couple type, there is a set of available contracts. C is the set …
W× M is a couple type. For each couple type, there is a set of available contracts. C is the set …
Universally rational belief hierarchies
E Tsakas - International Game Theory Review, 2014 - World Scientific
In a recent paper, Tsakas [2013 Rational belief hierarchies, Journal of Mathematical
Economics, Maastricht University] introduced the notion of rational beliefs. These are Borel …
Economics, Maastricht University] introduced the notion of rational beliefs. These are Borel …