Game theory for cyber security and privacy

CT Do, NH Tran, C Hong, CA Kamhoua… - ACM Computing …, 2017 - dl.acm.org
In this survey, we review the existing game-theoretic approaches for cyber security and
privacy issues, categorizing their application into two classes, security and privacy. To show …

Betrayal, distrust, and rationality: Smart counter-collusion contracts for verifiable cloud computing

C Dong, Y Wang, A Aldweesh, P McCorry… - Proceedings of the …, 2017 - dl.acm.org
Cloud computing has become an irreversible trend. Together comes the pressing need for
verifiability, to assure the client the correctness of computation outsourced to the cloud …

Collusion-resilience in transaction fee mechanism design

H Chung, T Roughgarden, E Shi - … of the 25th ACM Conference on …, 2024 - dl.acm.org
Users bid in a transaction fee mechanism (TFM) to get their transactions included and
confirmed by a blockchain protocol. Roughgarden (EC'21) initiated the formal treatment of …

Research on financial risk management model of internet supply chain based on data science

Q Yang, Y Wang, Y Ren - Cognitive Systems Research, 2019 - Elsevier
The supply chain financial risk management model is established under the Internet
financial model, so as to improve the supply chain's ability and resist risks, a financial risk …

What can cryptography do for decentralized mechanism design

E Shi, H Chung, K Wu - arXiv preprint arXiv:2209.14462, 2022 - arxiv.org
Recent works of Roughgarden (EC'21) and Chung and Shi (SODA'23) initiate the study of a
new decentralized mechanism design problem called transaction fee mechanism design …

Rational protocol design: Cryptography against incentive-driven adversaries

J Garay, J Katz, U Maurer… - 2013 IEEE 54th …, 2013 - ieeexplore.ieee.org
Existing work on" rational cryptographic protocols" treats each party (or coalition of parties)
running the protocol as a selfish agent trying to maximize its utility. In this work we propose a …

Presto: A systematic framework for blockchain consensus protocols

S Leonardos, D Reijsbergen… - IEEE Transactions on …, 2020 - ieeexplore.ieee.org
The rapid evolution of blockchain technology has brought together stakeholders from
fundamentally different backgrounds. The result is a diverse ecosystem, as exemplified by …

Maximizing miner revenue in transaction fee mechanism design

K Wu, E Shi, H Chung - arXiv preprint arXiv:2302.12895, 2023 - arxiv.org
Transaction fee mechanism design is a new decentralized mechanism design problem
where users bid for space on the blockchain. Several recent works showed that the …

Fair computation with rational players

A Groce, J Katz - Annual International Conference on the Theory and …, 2012 - Springer
We consider the problem of fairness in two-party computation, where this means (informally)
that both parties should learn the correct output. A seminal result of Cleve (STOC 1986) …

BFR-MPC: a blockchain-based fair and robust multi-party computation scheme

H Gao, Z Ma, S Luo, Z Wang - IEEE access, 2019 - ieeexplore.ieee.org
In a general secure multi-party computation (MPC) protocol, two or more participants who do
not trust each other, use their respective secret inputs to calculate a joint function in a …