In a number of interesting environments, dynamic screening involves positive selection: in
contrast with Coasian dynamics, only the most motivated remain over time. The paper …

We analyze the effect of transparency of past trading volumes in markets where an informed
long-lived seller can repeatedly trade with short-lived uninformed buyers. Transparency …

We introduce a new approach to bargaining, with strategic and axiomatic foundations, into
models of decentralized asset markets. According to this approach, which encompasses the …

I study how the arrival of new private information affects bargaining outcomes. A seller
makes offers to a buyer. The buyer is privately informed about her valuation and the seller …

We consider a dynamic adverse selection model where privately informed sellers of divisible
assets can choose how much of their asset to sell at each point in time to competitive buyers …

We allow buyers to choose the timing of offers in a dynamic adverse selection model with a
single seller. Buyers have private information and can delay their one-time private offers to …

This paper analyzes information spillover in a multi-good adverse selection model in which
a privately informed seller trades two different goods in two different markets. Buyers learn …

The recent advancements in information technologies have revolutionized the way firms
interact with consumers and collect consumer information on a large scale. Traditional …

This paper studies bargaining between a seller and a buyer with binary private valuation.
Because the setting is more tractable than the case of general valuation distributions …

I analyze a dynamic model of concurrent bargaining in which multiple long-lived prospective
buyers compete to trade with a long-lived seller over two periods. The paper investigates …