Iterative voting

R Meir - Trends in computational social choice, 2017 - books.google.com
In typical theoretical models of voting, all voters submit their vote at once, without an option
to change or revise their decision. While this assumption fits some political voting settings, it …

[图书][B] Strategic voting

R Meir - 2018 - books.google.com
Social choice theory deals with aggregating the preferences of multiple individuals
regarding several available alternatives, a situation colloquially known as voting. There are …

Strategic voting with incomplete information

U Endriss, S Obraztsova, M Polukarov… - 2016 - eprints.soton.ac.uk
Classical results in social choice theory on the susceptibility of voting rules to strategic
manipulation make the assumption that the manipulator has complete information regarding …

[HTML][HTML] Iterative voting and acyclic games

R Meir, M Polukarov, JS Rosenschein, NR Jennings - Artificial Intelligence, 2017 - Elsevier
Multi-agent decision problems, in which independent agents have to agree on a joint plan of
action or allocation of resources, are central to artificial intelligence. In such situations …

Computational social choice: The first ten years and beyond

H Aziz, F Brandt, E Elkind, P Skowron - … and Software Science: State of the …, 2019 - Springer
Computational social choice is a research area at the intersection of computer science,
mathematics, and economics that is concerned with aggregation of preferences of multiple …

Analysis of equilibria in iterative voting schemes

Z Rabinovich, S Obraztsova, O Lev… - Proceedings of the …, 2015 - ojs.aaai.org
Following recent studies of iterative voting and its effects on plurality vote outcomes, we
provide characterisations and complexity results for three models of iterative voting under …

Strategic behavior is bliss: iterative voting improves social welfare

J Kavner, L Xia - Advances in Neural Information …, 2021 - proceedings.neurips.cc
Recent work in iterative voting has defined the additive dynamic price of anarchy (ADPoA)
as the difference in social welfare between the truthful and worst-case equilibrium profiles …

Introduction to computational social choice

F Brandt, V Conitzer, U Endriss, J Lang… - … of Computational Social …, 2016 - hal.science
Social choice theory is the field of scientific inquiry that studies the aggregation of individual
preferences toward a collective choice. For example, social choice theorists—who hail from …

[PDF][PDF] Convergence and quality of iterative voting under non-scoring rules

A Koolyk, O Lev, JS Rosenschein - Proceedings of the 2016 …, 2016 - ifaamas.org
Iterative voting is a social choice mechanism whereby voters are allowed to continually
make strategic changes to their stated preferences until no further change is desired. We …

Convergence of iterative scoring rules

O Lev, JS Rosenschein - Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research, 2016 - jair.org
In multiagent systems, social choice functions can help aggregate the distinct preferences
that agents have over alternatives, enabling them to settle on a single choice. Despite the …