“TRADE is BAD.” So wrote President Donald Trump on a draft speech he was editing on Air
Force One while returning from a G-20 summit meeting in 2017.1 This statement reflects the …

The structure of protection across sectors has been interpreted as the result of competition
among lobbies to influence politicians, but lobbies have been treated as unitary decision …

In order to explain the prevalence and persistence of trade protection, a large body of work
that departs from the notion of welfare maximizing governments and emphasizes instead …

The median-voter approach to trade policy determination (within a Heckscher-Ohlin
framework) as in Mayer [Am. Econ. Rev. 74 (5)(1984) 970] predicts that an increase in …

This chapter surveys research on the demand for protectionism as well as theoretical and
empirical work on the (i) electoral mechanisms, the (ii) lobbying institutions, and the (iii) …

This paper presents an empirical investigation of how agricultural land ownership inequality
and government ideology (right-wing vs. left-wing) affect agricultural protection …

The ability to cooperate in the provision of a pubic good is analyzed in a repeated game.
Holding the level of provision fixed, with quasi-linear utility we find that the critical value of …

This paper develops a model in which tariffs are determined through bargaining between a
utility maximizing policy maker and an industry lobby. Individual firms only contribute to the …

Hegel's philosophy has witnessed periods of revival and oblivion, at times considered to be
an unrivalled and all-embracing system of thought, but often renounced with no less ardour …

As everyone knows, intuition is warm and fuzzy, qualitative, not measurable. Economics, on
the other hand, is quantitative, and if it is not a hard science, at least it is the" queen of the …