I study a principal-agent model in which a principal hires an agent to collect information
about an unknown continuous state. The agent acquires a signal whose distribution is …

We study the effect of increased flexibility--increasing the number of actions available to an
agent--on an agent's value for information. Adding a single action makes information more …

We study the design of contracts that incentivize a researcher to conduct a costly
experiment, extending the work of Yoder (2022) from binary states to a general state space …

We revisit Popper's falsifiability criterion. A tester hires a potential expert to produce a theory,
offering payments contingent on the observed performance of the theory. We argue that if …

This paper explains regret as an optimal self-control mechanism to motivate attention, and
so improve decision-making. The model endogenizes the optimal emotions as incentivizes …

We study settings where information in the form of Bayesian signals is acquired by an expert
on behalf of a principal. Information acquisition is costly for the expert and crucially not …

An expert with no inherent interest in an unknown binary state can exert effort to acquire a
piece of falsifiable evidence informative of it. A designer can incentivize learning using a …