We review the accounting literature on innovation, focusing on the economic attributes of
innovation that collectively differentiate innovation from other assets: novelty, nonrivalry, and …

We identify a novel force behind the benefit of misaligned preferences in corporate
governance. Our model entails a CEO who encounters a project and, after gathering …

We discuss Feng et al.(2024), which studies a dynamic model of delegated investment. The
paper provides novel insights into the optimal contract between a principal and an agent …

In their role as initiators of new business projects, CEOs have an advantage over access to
and control over project-related information. This exacerbates pre-existing agency frictions …

Extant analytical work studying investments in the presence of earnings manipulation
typically considers either one-period models or models where manipulation has only short …

This paper studies the optimal contractual arrangement when managers have private
information about the progress and delays during firm operations or product development …