We characterize optimal honest and obedient (HO) mechanisms for the classic collective
action problem with private information, where group success requires costly participation by …

We consider a (pure) public goods provision problem with voluntary participation in a
quasilinear economy. We propose a new hybrid solution concept, the free‐riding‐proof core …

It is well known that ex post efficient mechanisms for the provision of indivisible public goods
are not interim individually rational. However, the corresponding literature assumes that …

We consider a public good provision game with voluntary participation. Agents participating
in the game provide a public good and pay the fees according to a mechanism (allocation …

Mechanism design, a subset of game theory focusing on developing institutions and rules to
drive strategic behavior toward specified goals, has emerged as a valuable tool for …

We compare the voluntary contribution mechanism with any mechanism attaining Pareto-
efficient allocations when each agent can choose whether he/she participates in the …

We examine a voluntary participation game in public good provision in which each agent
has a demand level for the public good. The agent's demand level is the minimum level of …

Purpose In this paper we show how the Kolm triangle method, which is a standard tool for
visualizing allocations in a public good economy, can also be used to provide a …

We examine a monopolistic supplier's decision about a pure public good when he/she must
negotiate with beneficiaries of the good. In our model, while the level of the public good is …

The strategic analysis of voluntary participation in the public good provision has shown two
distinct results. First, when the provision of public goods is binary, there are Nash equilibria …