Corporate leniency programs when firms have private information: the push of prosecution and the pull of pre‐emption
JE Harrington Jr - The Journal of Industrial Economics, 2013 - Wiley Online Library
A corporate leniency program provides relief from government penalties to the first member
of a cartel to cooperate with the authorities. This study explores the incentives to apply for …
of a cartel to cooperate with the authorities. This study explores the incentives to apply for …
The law and economics of information sharing: The good, the bad and the ugly
M Bennett, P Collins - European Competition Journal, 2010 - Taylor & Francis
We have entered what is known as an “information age”: a term used to describe a period in
history that is characterised for the first time by the ability of individuals to access, transfer …
history that is characterised for the first time by the ability of individuals to access, transfer …
Firm-specific information and explicit collusion in experimental oligopolies
F Gomez-Martinez, S Onderstal… - European Economic …, 2016 - Elsevier
We experimentally study the effect of information about competitors' actions on cartel stability
and firms' incentives to form cartels in Cournot markets. As in previous experiments, markets …
and firms' incentives to form cartels in Cournot markets. As in previous experiments, markets …
Corporate leniency with private information: The push of prosecution and the pull of pre-emption
JE Harrington - 2011 - econstor.eu
A corporate leniency program provides relief from government penalties to the first member
of a cartel to come forward and cooperate with the authorities. This study explores the …
of a cartel to come forward and cooperate with the authorities. This study explores the …
L'évolution des procédures de clémence
F Marchal - Revue française d'économie, 2013 - cairn.info
Les programmes de clémence ont constitué un tournant majeur dans la lutte contre les
cartels. Censés assurer à la fois leur dissuasion et leur détection, ces programmes avaient …
cartels. Censés assurer à la fois leur dissuasion et leur détection, ces programmes avaient …
Corporate Leniency with Private Information: An Exploratory Example
JE Harrington - Recent Advances in the Analysis of Competition …, 2012 - elgaronline.com
One of the most important policy developments in US antitrust policy in recent decades is the
1993 revision of the Corporate Leniency Program by the Department of Justice (DOJ) …
1993 revision of the Corporate Leniency Program by the Department of Justice (DOJ) …
[PDF][PDF] Essays in experimental industrial organization: How communication and information affect market outcomes
F Gómez Martinez - 2016 - pure.uva.nl
This thesis consists of three independent essays that use laboratory experiments to address
a number of industrial organization questions. Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 study cartels in …
a number of industrial organization questions. Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 study cartels in …
[PDF][PDF] Firm-‐specific information and explicit collusion in experimental oligopolies
F Gomez, SO Martinez, J Sonnemans - 2015 - www1feb-uva.nl
We experimentally study the effect of information about competitors' actions on cartel stability
and firms' incentives to form cartels in Cournot markets. As in previous experiments, markets …
and firms' incentives to form cartels in Cournot markets. As in previous experiments, markets …