We consider moral hazard problems where a principal has access to rich monitoring data
about an agent's action. Rather than focusing on optimal contracts (which are known to in …

A multi-product monopolist faces a buyer who is privately informed about his valuations for
the goods. As is well-known, optimal mechanisms are in general complicated, while simple …

We study how long‐lived, rational agents learn in a social network. In every period, after
observing the past actions of his neighbors, each agent receives a private signal, and …

We propose a measure of learning efficiency for non-finite state spaces. We characterize the
complexity of a learning problem by the metric entropy of its state space. We then describe …

A group of agents with a common prior receive informative signals about an unknown state
repeatedly over time. If these signals were public, agents' beliefs would be identical and …

We analyze the evolution of common beliefs among two agents, where one agent (the
informed) knows the true state while the other (the uninformed) learns the true state over T …

This paper studies information aggregation through the strategic behavior of privately
informed agents under crowdfunding. In crowdfunding campaigns, agents pay a fixed …