Standard models of hierarchy assume that agents and middle managers are better informed
than principals. We estimate the value of the informational advantage held by supervisors …

Po liti cal clientelism represents a classic instance of an informal po liti cal institution that
plays an impor tant role in po liti cal economy of underdevelopment. The pervasiveness of …

This paper provides causal evidence on how political parties can sway voters at scale in
nascent electoral democracies. We collect novel data on expressway construction by the …

Unlike much of the growing literature on political clientelism, this short paper contains mainly
the author's general reflections on the broad issues of governance (or mis-governance …

Role of public financing of human development (HD) is inevitable, especially for developing
countries like India where access to resources and economic opportunities are not equitably …

An important area for continuing research concerns the linkages between clientelist politics
and economic development. This includes not only the direct impact of clientelism on poor …

We conduct a field experiment in India comparing two ways of delegating selection of
microcredit clients among smallholder farmers to local intermediaries: a private trader …

This study examines whether strategic delegation of land tenancy contracts is linked to local-
level political business cycles in the context of a village institution–bengkok land–prevalent …

Although parties are documented to invest significant amounts of resources towards
strengthening their hold on local governments, whether mayors benefit their parties in …

This paper investigates the effect of receiving employment benefits under the Mahatma
Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee (MGNREG) scheme on the household's trust …