We consider the strategic use of information by an online platform to both guide consumers'
search through product recommendations and influence sellers' targeted advertising …

We study a natural competitive-information-design variant for the Pandora's Box problem
[31], where each box is associated with a strategic information sender who can design what …

We consider sequential search by an agent who cannot observe the quality of goods but can
acquire information by buying signals from a profit-maximizing principal with limited …

We consider a model of oligopolistic competition in a market with search frictions, in which
competing firms with products of unknown quality advertise how much information a …

I study optimal information provision by a search goods seller. While the seller controls a
consumer's pre-search information, he cannot control post-search information because the …

We analyze the role of competition in information provision in random search markets.
Multiple symmetric senders compete for the receiver's investment by disclosing information …

We consider a model of oligopolistic competition in a market with search frictions, in which
competing firms with products of unknown quality advertise how much information a …

In many economic situations, such as job search and online shopping, agents are
sequentially searching for information to choose one of a few options. Information revealed …

We study the ramifications of increased commitment power for information provision in an
oligopolistic market with search frictions. Although prices are posted and, therefore, guide …

Two long-lived senders play a dynamic game of competitive persuasion. Each period, each
provides information to a single short-lived receiver. When the senders also set prices, we …