This paper studies stable and (one-sided) strategy-proof rules in many-to-one matching
markets with contracts. Not assuming any kind of substitutes condition or the law of …

We investigate extension/resource monotonicity and respecting improvements properties of
the cumulative offer process (COP). Extension monotonicity says that no doctor is to be …

We mechanize proofs of several results from the matching with contracts literature, which
generalize those of the classical two-sided matching scenarios that go by the name of stable …

This thesis examines the properties of an algorithm, namely the Cumulative Offer Process
(COP), which has been the principal algorithm in the matching with contracts setting …

Title Supplementary Note to “On Stable and Strategy- Proof Rules in Matching Markets with
Contracts” Author(s) HIRATA, Daisu Page 1 Hitotsubashi University Repository Title …

This thesis consists of three essays on the economics of contracts and organizations. The
first essay studies organizational design as the allocation of decision rights, primarily …

I study the stability and doctor-optimality of doctors' proposing cumulative offer process in the
many-to-one matching with contracts. First, I explore some conventional hospital-by-hospital …

Supplementary Note to “On Stable and Strategy-Proof Rules in Matching Markets with Contracts”
Page 1 Supplementary Note to “On Stable and Strategy-Proof Rules in Matching Markets with …

In this paper I show that the pairwise and set-wise stable allocations in many-to-one
matching problems with contracts are equivalent under the choice procedures of schools …