Popular matchings have recently been a subject of study in the context of the so-called
House Allocation Problem, where the objective is to match applicants to houses over which …

We study the problem of matching applicants to jobs under one-sided preferences; that is,
each applicant ranks a non-empty subset of jobs under an order of preference, possibly …

An input to the Popular Matching problem, in the roommates setting (as opposed to the
marriage setting), consists of a graph G (not necessarily bipartite) where each vertex ranks …

We study social welfare in one-sided matching markets where the goal is to efficiently
allocate n items to n agents that each have a complete, private preference list and a unit …

We consider the problem of finding a popular matching in the Weighted Capacitated House
Allocation problem (WCHA). An instance of WCHA involves a set of agents and a set of …

In this paper, we study mechanism design problems in the ordinal setting wherein the
preferences of agents are described by orderings over outcomes, as opposed to specific …

An instance of the popular matching problem (POP-M) consists of a set of applicants and a
set of posts. Each applicant has a preference list that strictly ranks a subset of the posts. A …

We study deviations by a group of agents in the three main types of matching markets: the
house allocation, the marriage, and the roommates models. For a given instance, we call a …

We consider capacitated rank-maximal matchings. Rank-maximal matchings have been
considered before and are defined as follows. We are given a bipartite graph …

Suppose that each member of a set of agents has a preference list of a subset of houses,
possibly involving ties, and each agent and house has their capacity denoting the maximum …