We study first-and second-price auctions with resale in a model with independent private
values. With asymmetric bidders, the resulting inefficiencies create a motive for post-auction …

This paper extends the belief-free approach to robust mechanism design to dynamic
environments, in which agents obtain information over time. A social choice function (SCF) is …

We study a model of common-value auctions with two bidders in which bidders' private
information are independently and asymmetrically distributed. We present sufficient and …

We show that when the weak bidder's bargaining power in the resale market is weakened,
the auctioneer's revenue from the first-price auction with resale is lower. Using the idea of …

We study when the voting outcome is independent of the order of issues put up for vote in a
spatial multidimensional voting model. Agents equipped with norm-based preferences that …

We study a model of common value auctions in which bidders' private information are
independently and asymmetrically distributed. We provide two sufficient conditions under …

We present a model of Bayesian games with a continuum of players and prove that pure
strategy Bayesian Nash equilibria exist and are extensively robust. This extends Kalais …

We study multi-unit auctions in the presence of resale opportunities among bidders who
have either single-or multi-unit demand. We analyze equilibrium for Vickrey auctions with …

This thesis consists of three chapters. In the first chapter, we consider coalition formation
games with externalities. A natural extension of superadditivity is not sufficient to imply that …