This chapter analyzes the private rationale and the social costs and benefits of market
foreclosure, here defined as a firm's restriction of output in one market through the use of …

Publisher Summary This chapter discusses the contractual relationship between two parties
at successive stages in the vertical chain of production and marketing for a good …

We present a mechanism based on managerial incentives through which common
ownership affects product market outcomes. Firm-level variation in common ownership …

International crises are modeled as a political “war of attrition” in which state leaders choose
at each moment whether to attack, back down, or escalate. A leader who backs down suffers …

We examine compensation contracts for managers in imperfectly competitive product
markets. We show that strategic interactions among firms can explain the lack of relative …

When governments meet in the international arena, their actions reflect the political
situations at home. Previous studies of trade relations have focused on governments that are …

This article studies the connection between risk taking and executive compensation in
financial institutions. A model of shareholders, debtholders, depositors, and an executive …

Principal-agent relationships are typically assumed to be motivated by efficiency gains from
comparative advantage. However, principals may also delegate tasks to avoid taking direct …

It is widely believed that a supplier who distributes her product through retailers can achieve
the vertically integrated outcome with nonlinear contracts, provided the retail price is the only …

This book presents a theory of the firm based on its economic role as an intermediary
between customers and suppliers. Professor Spulber demonstrates how the intermediation …