Using a large data set of performance goals employed in executive incentive contracts, we
find that a disproportionately large number of firms exceed their goals by a small margin as …

We investigate whether CEO power influences a firm's decision to change its compensation
system in response to regulatory and public pressure. In particular, we assess whether CEO …

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to investigate the impact of CEO incentive-based
compensation on earnings management, taking into account the influence of institutional …

This paper examines whether the choice of performance measures in CEO bonus
compensation contracts is associated with earnings management. From a sample of …

The aim of this study is to explore how stock options are used for executive remuneration in
blockholder-dominated listed firms. By analysing how stock options granted to executive …

The scholarly literature on executive compensation is vast. As such, this literature provides
an unparalleled resource for studying the interaction between the setting of incentives (or …

Previous research suggests that investment‐cash flow sensitivity (ICS) has arisen from
agency costs. This study investigates whether equity‐based compensation (EBC) reduces …

This paper investigates how the features of CEO equity-based compensation are associated
with the agency costs of monitoring (measured by external audit fees) in an Australia setting …

Stock options (hereafter SOs) have been extensively investigated by the literature. The
debate has been mainly grounded in the agency theory that has interpreted these tools as …

We investigate the association between executive stock option (ESO) vesting conditions,
corporate governance and CEO attributes. Using observations from the 250 largest …