Reasoning about knowledge—particularly the knowledge of agents who reason about the
world and each other's knowledge—was once the exclusive province of philosophers and …

When making decisions, people naturally face uncertainty about the potential consequences
of their actions due in part to limits in their capacity to represent, evaluate or deliberate …

Companies innovating in dynamic environments face the combined challenge of
unforeseeable uncertainty (the inability to recognize the relevant influence variables and …

Novel startup companies often face not only risk, but also unforeseeable uncertainty (the
inability to recognize and articulate all relevant variables affecting performance). The …

The standard state-spaces of asymmetric information preclude non-trivial forms of
unawareness (Modica and Rustichini (Theory Decision 37 (1994) 107–124); Dekel, Lipman …

After an introductory section, this article will focus on four questions: How should the Kyoto
School be defined? What is meant by its central philosophical concept of “absolute …

There has been a remarkable increase in work at the interface of computer science and
game theory in the past decade. In this article I survey some of the main themes of work in …

This article introduces a new approach to modeling the expanding universe of decision
makers in the wake of growing awareness, and invokes the axiomatic approach to model the …

S. Modica and A. Rustichini (1994, Theory and Decision37, 107–124) provided a logic for
reasoning about knowledge where agents may be unaware of certain propositions …

Standard game theory assumes that the structure of the game is common knowledge among
players. We relax this assumption by considering extensive games where agents may be …