W Diamond, N Agarwal - Quantitative Economics, 2017 - Wiley Online Library
A large class of two‐sided matching models that include both transferable and non‐ transferable utility result in positive assortative matching along a latent index. Data from …
LG Epstein, H Kaido, K Seo - Econometrica, 2016 - Wiley Online Library
Call an economic model incomplete if it does not generate a probabilistic prediction even given knowledge of all parameter values. We propose a method of inference about unknown …
Agents in two-sided matching games vary in characteristics that are unobservable in typical data on matching markets. We investigate the identification of the distribution of unobserved …
G Aryal, DH Kim - Journal of Business & Economic Statistics, 2013 - Taylor & Francis
This article proposes a decision-theoretic method to choose a single reserve price for partially identified auction models, such as Haile and Tamer, using data on transaction …
YW Hsieh, M Shum, S Yang - … Model (February 1, 2015). USC-INET …, 2015 - papers.ssrn.com
Using data from" WebsiteX", one of the largest online marketplaces in the world, we estimate a structural model of sponsored search auctions where bidders have heterogeneous click …
This thesis uses administrative data from the National Pupil Database (NPD) to examine the phenomenon of ethnic sorting into English secondary schools. The thesis investigates the …
LG Epstein, K Seo - Manuscript. Boston Univ, 2011 - people.bu.edu
We generalize de Finettims exchangeable Bayesian model to accommo% date ambiguity. As a central motivating example, we consider a policy maker facing a cross% section of …
Many economic systems can be described as two-sided matching markets, with labor and marriage markets being the leading examples. Although the theoretic work can be dated …
LG Epstein, K Seo - Research in Economics, 2014 - Elsevier
The paper outlines an exchangeable non-Bayesian model of preference generalizing the Savage/de Finetti classic model of subjective expected utility preference with an …