Collusion-resilience in transaction fee mechanism design

H Chung, T Roughgarden, E Shi - … of the 25th ACM Conference on …, 2024 - dl.acm.org
Users bid in a transaction fee mechanism (TFM) to get their transactions included and
confirmed by a blockchain protocol. Roughgarden (EC'21) initiated the formal treatment of …

Game-Theoretically Fair Distributed Sampling

SAK Thyagarajan, P Soni, K Wu - Annual International Cryptology …, 2024 - Springer
Cleve's celebrated result (STOC'86) showed that a strongly fair multi-party coin-toss is
impossible against majority-sized coalitions. Recently, however, a fascinating line of work …

On the (Im) possibility of Game-Theoretically Fair Leader Election Protocols

O Klein, I Komargodski, C Zhu - Theory of Cryptography Conference, 2024 - Springer
We consider the problem of electing a leader among n parties with the guarantee that each
(honest) party has a reasonable probability of being elected, even in the presence of a …