The study of approximate mechanism design for facility location problems has been in the
center of research at the intersection of artificial intelligence and economics for the last …

We survey a burgeoning and promising new research area that considers the online nature
of many practical fair division problems. We identify wide variety of such online fair division …

As one novel meta-heuristic algorithm, African Vultures Optimization Algorithm (AVOA) has
been proved to be efficient in solving continuous optimization problems. However, many real …

We study mechanism design with predictions for the obnoxious facility location problem. We
present deterministic strategyproof mechanisms that display tradeoffs between robustness …

The facility location game is an extensively studied problem in mechanism design. In the
classical model, the cost of each agent is her distance to the nearest facility. In this paper, we …

We focus on a simple, one-dimensional collective decision problem (often referred to as the
facility location problem) and explore issues of strategyproofness and proportionality-based …

Mechanism Design seeks to establish protocols for aggregating the private information of a
set of agents to optimize a global objective. Nonetheless, optimizing a communal goal solely …

We initiate the study of the capacity constrained facility location problem from a mechanism
design perspective. In the capacity constrained setting, the facility can serve only a subset of …

We study the facility location problems where agents are located on a real line and divided
into groups based on criteria such as ethnicity or age. Our aim is to design mechanisms to …

We consider the problem of locating a facility to serve a set of agents located along a line.
The Nash welfare objective function, defined as the product of the agents' utilities, is known …