This chapter surveys a sizable and growing literature on coalition formation. We refer to
theories in which one or more groups of agents (“coalitions”) deliberately get together to …

This review of the theoretical literature on legislative and multilateral bargaining begins with
presentation of the seminal Baron-Ferejohn model. The review then encompasses the …

In dynamic collective decision making, current decisions determine the future distribution of
political power and influence future decisions. We develop a general framework to study this …

The Coase theorem is one of the most influential and controversial ideas to emerge from
post–World War II economics. This article examines the theorem's origins, diffusion, and the …

We study the formation of a ruling coalition in non-democratic societies where institutions do
not enable political commitments. Each individual is endowed with a level of political power …

Trade policy is often cast as a solution to the free-riding problem in international climate
agreements. This paper examines the extent to which trade policy can deliver on this …

An economy with a finite number of agents and a finite number of states is considered. An
exogenous institutional rule prescribes which moves from one state to another are feasible …

This paper proposes a model for multilateral contracting, where contracts are written and
renegotiated over time, and where contracts may impose externalities on other agents …

An organizational coalition consists of individuals who, despite their persistent differences,
work together to pursue a mutually beneficial goal. While central to the political view of the …

Committee voting has mostly been investigated from the perspective of the standard Baron–
Ferejohn model of bargaining over the division of a pie, in which bargaining ends as soon …