JW Hatfield, F Kojima - Games and Economic Behavior, 2009 - Elsevier
Hatfield and Milgrom [Hatfield, John William, Milgrom, Paul R., 2005. Matching with contracts. Amer. Econ. Rev. 95, 913–935] present a unified model of matching with …
R Martínez, J Massó, A Neme, J Oviedo - International Journal of Game …, 2004 - Springer
For the many-to-one matching model in which firms have substitutable and quota q− separable preferences over subsets of workers we show that the workers-optimal stable …
We revisit the concept of fairness in the Student Placement framework. We declare an allocation as\upalpha α-equitable if no agent can propose an alternative allocation that …
Z Jiao, G Tian - Games and Economic Behavior, 2017 - Elsevier
This paper considers the incentive compatibility in many-to-many two-sided matching problems. We first show that the Blocking Lemma holds for many-to-many matchings under …
Recent years have witnessed a growing trend that offline social events are organized via online platforms. Along this line, large efforts have been devoted to recommending …
M Kitahara, Y Okumura - Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2019 - Elsevier
This study analyzes the number of matches in stable and efficient matchings. The benchmark number of matches is the largest one among the matchings in which no agent …
JCD Fisher - Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2020 - Elsevier
In classic matching markets, individuals choose their partners and each pair chooses a contract from a finite set of feasible contracts; the existence of stable allocations then follows …
This paper revisits the college admissions problem and studies the efficiency, incentive, and monotonicity for colleges. We show that max-min criterion that is stronger than …