The game theoretic perspective in auction bidding has provided a powerful normative
framework for the analysis of auctions and it has generated an impressive volume of …

This survey outlines a general and modular theory for proving approximation guarantees for
equilibria of auctions in complex settings. This theory complements traditional economic …

This text provides a look at select topics in economic mechanism design through the lens of
approximation. It reviews the classical economic theory of mechanism design wherein a …

We study the complexity of finding an approximate (pure) Bayesian Nash equilibrium in a
first-price auction with common priors when the tie-breaking rule is part of the input. We …

Recent price-of-anarchy analyses of games of complete information suggest that coarse
correlated equilibria, which characterize outcomes resulting from no-regret learning …

We report on results of several laboratory experiments that investigate on‐line procurement
auctions in which suppliers bid on price, but exogenous bidder quality affects winner …

I propose a new mechanism design approach to the problem of ranking standard auctions
with two heterogeneous bidders. A key feature of the approach is that it may be possible to …

This paper develops tools for welfare and revenue analyses of Bayes-Nash equilibria in
asymmetric auctions with single-dimensional agents. We employ these tools to derive price …

This dissertation develops a method to detect collusion and estimate its effect on the seller's
revenue in first-price auctions with independent, private valuations. The challenge is that …

In a multidimensional procurement auction, such as a most economically advantageous
tender, asymmetric opponents, with different cost structure and predetermined quality …