In a typical social choice scenario, agents rank the available alternatives and have to
collectively decide on the best alternative, or a ranking of the alternatives. If there are just …

Social choice becomes easier on restricted preference domains such as single-peaked,
single-crossing, and Euclidean preferences. Many impossibility theorems disappear, the …

A survey of papers on practically significant restrictions on the preference profile of a
collective is carried out, including single-peaked preferences, group-separable preferences …

Interactive Democracy is an umbrella term that encompasses a variety of approaches to
make collective decision making processes more engaging and responsive. A common goal …

Many electoral bribery, control, and manipulation problems (which we will refer to in general
as" manipulative actions" problems) are NP-hard in the general case. It has recently been …

We investigate the problem of deciding whether a given preference profile is close to having
a certain nice structure, as for instance single-peaked, single-caved, single-crossing, value …

We introduce the domain of preferences that are single-peaked on a circle, which is a
generalization of the well-studied single-peaked domain. This preference restriction is …

We study the complexity of winner determination in single-crossing elections under two
classic fully proportional representation rules—Chamberlin–Courant's rule and Monroe's …

We characterize single-crossing preference profiles in terms of two forbidden substructures,
one of which contains three voters and six (not necessarily distinct) alternatives, and one of …

We present a collection of 7582 real-world elections divided into 25 datasets from various
sources ranging from sports competitions over music charts to survey-and indicator-based …