A note on pre-play communication

J Sobel - Games and Economic Behavior, 2017 - Elsevier
Consider a finite two-player game with one round of communication. Restrict players to a
subset of “monotonic” strategies. The paper justifies this restriction. The paper provides …

An exploratory study focusing on the influencing factors of effective succession in family owned businesses within the context of London United Kingdom

O Onukwugha - 2024 - search.proquest.com
Since family-owned businesses employ 38% of the labour force and 50% of the private
sector, they remain the primary drivers of economic growth and employment, which has …

[图书][B] Sustaining a family business beyond the second generation

DW Austin - 2018 - search.proquest.com
A significant number of funeral homes in the United States are family-owned businesses.
These family-owned funeral businesses contribute to society throughout generations to …

Timing of communication

P Bhattacharya, K Nielsen, A Sengupta - The Economic Journal, 2020 - academic.oup.com
Using an experiment, we demonstrate that a communication regime in which a worker
communicates about his intended effort is less effective in:(i) soliciting truthful information; …

Believing when credible: talking about future plans and past actions

KH Schlag, P Vida - 2015 - epub.ub.uni-muenchen.de
We explore in an equilibrium framework whether games with multiple Nash equilibria are
easier to play when players can communicate. We consider two variants, modelling talk …

Essays in Decision Making Under Uncertainty and Strategic Communication

K Nielsen - 2018 - rave.ohiolink.edu
In this dissertation, I use laboratory experiments to test decision theory and microeconomic
theory models. Chapters 1 and 2 study individual decision making under uncertainty, and …

Believing when credible: talking about future intentions and past actions

KH Schlag, P Vida - International Journal of Game Theory, 2021 - Springer
In an equilibrium framework, we explore how players communicate in games with multiple
Nash equilibria when messages that make sense are not ignored. Communication is about …

[PDF][PDF] Economics of Lying and Deception

J Sobel - eui.eu
Standard models of communication have multiple equilibria. There are many reasons for
this, but one of them is that abstract models of communication do not provide unambiguous …

Believing when credible: Talking about future plans and past actions

P Vida - 2015 - econstor.eu
We explore in an equilibrium framework whether games with multiple Nash equilibria are
easier to play when players can communicate. We consider two variants, modelling talk …

[PDF][PDF] Fall 2015 Economics 201: Lying and Deception for Game Theorists

J Sobel - Economics, 2015 - courses.ucsd.edu
Objectives: For you: Introduction to an advanced topic; experience reading papers criticallyI
want the class to organize some ideas that have been on my mind and provide research …