Randomization is commonplace in everyday resource allocation. We generalize the theory
of randomized assignment to accommodate multi-unit allocations and various real-world …

We present a survey of the emerging literature on the design of matching markets. We
survey the articles on discrete resource allocation problems, their solutions, and their …

We introduce a new notion of ex ante stability (or fairness) that would be desirable for a
school‐choice mechanism to satisfy. Our criterion stipulates that a mechanism must be …

This paper studies the problem of assigning a set of indivisible objects to a set of agents
when monetary transfers are not allowed and agents reveal only ordinal preferences, but …

There is a wide range of economic problems that involve the exchange of indivisible goods
with no monetary transfers, starting from the housing market model of the seminal paper by …

Cake cutting is one of the most fundamental settings in fair division and mechanism design
without money. In this paper, we consider different levels of three fundamental goals in cake …

This paper studies a generalization of the well known house allocation problem in which
agents may own fractions of different houses summing to an arbitrary quantity, but have use …

Computational social choice is a research area at the intersection of computer science,
mathematics, and economics that is concerned with aggregation of preferences of multiple …

We study multi-type housing markets, where there are p≥ 2 types of items, each agent is
initially endowed one item of each type, and the goal is to design mechanisms without …

A random assignment is ordinally efficient if it is not stochastically dominated with respect to
individual preferences over sure objects. When there are no private endowments, the set of …