Agency costs of controlling minority shareholders

H Cronqvist, M Nilsson - Journal of Financial and Quantitative …, 2003 - cambridge.org
This paper estimates the agency costs of controlling minority shareholders (CMSs), who
have control of a firm's votes, while owning only a minority of the cash flow rights. Analyzing …

Do IPO charters maximize firm value? Antitakeover protection in IPOs

R Daines, M Klausner - Journal of Law, Economics, and …, 2001 - academic.oup.com
This article focuses on the widely held views that antitakeover charter and bylaw provisions
(ATPs) increase agency costs, thereby reducing firm value, but that firms going public …

Explaining variation in takeover defenses: Blame the lawyers

JC Coates IV - Calif. L. Rev., 2001 - HeinOnline
In 1994, IBM made a $3.3 billion hostile takeover bid for Lotus.! De-spite a determination to
remain independent, management of Lotus capitulated within a week of IBM's bid. 2 At …

Dual class firms: Capitalization, ownership structure and recapitalization back into single class

B Amoako-Adu, BF Smith - Journal of Banking & Finance, 2001 - Elsevier
This paper analyses changes in capitalization and control of dual class firms before and
after IPO. The results indicate that the combination of a large controlling shareholder with …

A law and finance analysis of initial public offerings

M Holmen, P Högfeldt - Journal of Financial Intermediation, 2004 - Elsevier
Do families keep control of their firms because they, operating in an environment with weak
protection of minority shareholders, fear being exploited by management after the IPO? Or is …

The effect of IPOs on German family–owned firms: Governance changes, ownership structure, and performance

O Ehrhardt, E Nowak - Journal of Small Business Management, 2003 - Taylor & Francis
Although initial public offerings (IPOs) recently have attracted public and academic attention,
the special case of firms founded by families or single entrepreneurs has not been …

Monitoring as a motivation for IPO underpricing

O Aruǧaslan, DO Cook, R Kieschnick - The Journal of Finance, 2004 - Wiley Online Library
ABSTRACT Brennan and Franks (1997) and Stoughton and Zechner (1998) provide
contrasting arguments for why monitoring considerations create incentives for managers to …

Why do controlling families of public firms sell their remaining ownership stake?

S Klasa - Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 2007 - cambridge.org
I investigate what leads controlling families of publicly traded firms to sell their remaining
ownership stake. The sale of a controlling stake is best explained in the context of theories of …

Evolution of ownership and control around the world: the changing face of capitalism

J Franks, C Mayer - The handbook of the economics of corporate …, 2017 - Elsevier
This chapter documents the evolution of ownership and control of firms around the world
over a hundred year period from the beginning of the 20th century to today. It records the …

Managerial ability, growth opportunities, and IPO performance

JS Cox - Managerial Finance, 2017 - emerald.com
Purpose The purpose of this paper is to explain whether the level of managerial quality and
growth opportunities influences the operating and return performance between single and …