Computational social choice

F Brandt, V Conitzer, U Endriss - Multiagent systems, 2012 - books.google.com
Social choice theory concerns the design and formal analysis of methods for aggregating
the preferences of multiple agents. Examples of such methods include voting procedures …

[图书][B] Economics and computation

J Rothe - 2015 - Springer
1 Her work has been supported in part by an NRW grant for gender-sensitive universities
supporting her as a junior professor for Computational Social Choice and by the project …

Equilibria of plurality voting with abstentions

Y Desmedt, E Elkind - Proceedings of the 11th ACM conference on …, 2010 - dl.acm.org
In the traditional voting manipulation literature, it is assumed that a group of manipulators
jointly misrepresent their preferences to get a certain candidate elected, while the remaining …

Strategic behavior in judgment aggregation

D Baumeister, J Rothe, AK Selker - Trends in computational …, 2017 - books.google.com
Collective decision making is concerned with aggregating information reported by a number
of individuals into a collective decision appropriately capturing the individual views as a …

Computational social choice: The first ten years and beyond

H Aziz, F Brandt, E Elkind, P Skowron - … and Software Science: State of the …, 2019 - Springer
Computational social choice is a research area at the intersection of computer science,
mathematics, and economics that is concerned with aggregation of preferences of multiple …

[PDF][PDF] Empirical analysis of plurality election equilibria

DRM Thompson, O Lev, K Leyton-Brown… - Proceedings of the …, 2013 - researchgate.net
Voting is widely used to aggregate the different preferences of agents, even though these
agents are often able to manipulate the outcome through strategic voting. Most research on …

Plurality voting with truth-biased agents

S Obraztsova, E Markakis, DRM Thompson - International Symposium on …, 2013 - Springer
We study a game-theoretic model for Plurality, one of the most well-studied and widely-used
voting rules. It is well known that the most standard game-theoretic approaches can be …

Analysis of equilibria in iterative voting schemes

Z Rabinovich, S Obraztsova, O Lev… - Proceedings of the …, 2015 - ojs.aaai.org
Following recent studies of iterative voting and its effects on plurality vote outcomes, we
provide characterisations and complexity results for three models of iterative voting under …

Strategic behavior is bliss: iterative voting improves social welfare

J Kavner, L Xia - Advances in Neural Information …, 2021 - proceedings.neurips.cc
Recent work in iterative voting has defined the additive dynamic price of anarchy (ADPoA)
as the difference in social welfare between the truthful and worst-case equilibrium profiles …

Backward induction algorithm for a class of closed-loop Stackelberg games

R Kicsiny, Z Varga, A Scarelli - European Journal of Operational Research, 2014 - Elsevier
In the paper a new deterministic continuum-strategy two-player discrete-time dynamic
Stackelberg game is proposed with fixed finite time duration and closed-loop information …