This book offers a self-sufficient treatment of a key tool, game theory and mechanism design, to model, analyze, and solve centralized as well as decentralized design problems involving …
Mechanism design, an important tool in microeconomics, has found widespread applications in modelling and solving decentralized design problems in many branches of …
The central problem in computational mechanism design is the tension between incentive compatibility and computational efficiency. We establish the first significant approximability …
Mechanism design, an important tool in microeconomics, has found widespread applications in modelling and solving decentralized design problems in many branches of …
D Mishra, A Sen - Games and Economic Behavior, 2012 - Elsevier
We consider dominant strategy implementation in private values settings, when agents have multi-dimensional types, the set of alternatives is finite, monetary transfers are allowed, and …
In emerging service-oriented systems, such as computational clouds or grids, software agents are able to automatically procure distributed services to complete computational …
R Lavi - Algorithmic Game Theory, 2007 - algo.informatik.uni-frankfurt.de
We study the integration of game theoretic and computational considerations. In particular, we study the design of computationally efficient and incentive compatible mechanisms, for …
T Marchant, D Mishra - Social Choice and Welfare, 2015 - Springer
We study mechanism design in quasi-linear private values environments when there are two alternatives. We show that under a mild range condition, every implementable allocation …
In a setting where agents have quasi-linear utilities over social alternatives and a transferable commodity, we consider three properties that a social choice function may …