An Equivalence Theorem between geometric structures and utility functions allows new
methods for understanding preferences. Our classification of valuations into “Demand …

In recent years, many developments have been made in matching theory and its
applications to market design. This paper surveys them and suggests possible research …

In matching markets, the existence of stable matchings can only be guaranteed under
substantive restrictions on preferences. We investigate how these results change in large …

We generalize the scope of random allocation mechanisms, in which the mechanism first
identifies a feasible “expected allocation” and then implements it by randomizing over …

The digital economy led to many new services where supply is matched with demand for
various types of goods and services. More and more people and organizations are now in a …

We generalize the serial dictatorship (SD) and probabilistic serial (PS) mechanism for
assigning indivisible objects (seats in a school) to agents (students) to accommodate …

The final step in getting an Israeli MD is performing a year-long internship in one of the
hospitals in Israel. Internships are decided upon by a lottery, which is known as the …

We initiate the study of control actions in fair division problems where a benevolent or
malicious central organizer changes the structure of the fair division problem for self-interest …

In this paper we investigate some new applications of Scarf's Lemma. First, we introduce the
notion of fractional core for NTU-games, which is always nonempty by the Lemma. Stable …

Scarf's algorithm (Scarf, HE Econometrica 35, 50–69 1967) provides fractional core
elements for NTU-games. Biró and Fleiner [4] showed that Scarf's algorithm can be …