We examine whether mandating banks to issue subordinated debt would enhance market
monitoring and control risk taking. To evaluate whether subordinated debt enhances risk …

We analyze the effects of managerial incentive, firm characteristics and market timing on
floating-to-fixed rate debt structure of firms. We find that chief financial officer's (CFO's), not …

In light of the dramatic changes in the callable bond market, we reexamine the determinants
of callable bonds. Using data from 1980‐2003, we find that callable bonds are often issued …

Callable bonds offer higher yields compared to non-callable bonds. In this paper, we
examine the call spread in a global framework, while controlling for firm-level, bond-level …

This paper analyzes a firm's dynamic decisions: i) whether to issue a callable or non-
callable bond; ii) when to call the callable bond; and iii) whether to refund it when it is called …

We identify the call premium in nonconvertible callable bonds as an effective contracting
provision to address agency conflict due to reinvestment risk and credit rating improvements …

This study sets out a new methodology to exemplify, through a set of risk metrics called the
Greeks, impact of a bond's structured provisions (eg, call, put, and conversion options) on its …

Activist shareholders have an incentive to communicate and cooperate with other major
shareholders. However, the impact of their activity on information flow surrounding targeted …

Firms commonly incorporate make‐whole call provisions in their newly issued debt,
presumably to improve their ability to retire debt early if circumstances require. In return for …

Many papers find that standard structural models predict corporate bond spreads that are
too low compared to actual spreads, giving rise to the so-called credit spread puzzle. We …